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ABC V. AEREO: HOW THE SUPREME COURT’S FLAWED 
RATIONALE WILL IMPLICATE PROBLEMS IN NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES  
 
Collette Corser*  
 
The Copyright Act promotes the creation and progress of arts by 
protecting original works, such as by guaranteeing copyright 
holders the exclusive right to publicly perform their works. In an 
age of rapid technological development, courts have often 
struggled with how to best interpret and apply this public 
performance right to providers who stream broadcast television 
programs over the Internet. A central question in this debate is 
what constitutes a “performance” under the Copyright Act. This 
Recent Development explores the Supreme Court’s latest attempt 
at defining this issue, and argues that its decision in American 
Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. only further confuses 
this area of law and poses problems for other emerging 
technologies, including cloud storage and sharing technologies.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Congress enacted the Copyright Act to promote the progress of 
useful arts by protecting original works.1 Despite this clear and 
noble purpose, the meaning of copyright infringement under the 
Act has been a point of contention and has thus led to various 
results across jurisdictions. 2  This summer, the Supreme Court 
                                                            
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of North Carolina School of Law. I would 
like to thank the NC JOLT staff and editors for their assistance with this Recent 
Development, particularly Keta Desai, Kyle Evans, Kelly Morris, and Nicholas 
Turza. 
1 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2010). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).  
2 See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. Cablevision Systems Corp. Holdings, 
Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that defendant 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR service did not directly infringe on movie and television 
copyright holders’ rights); WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012) 
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again addressed the issue of copyright infringement and attempted 
to clarify this ambiguity in their opinion of American Broadcasting 
Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.3  
The Court considered whether Aereo, an online streaming 
service, infringed on the exclusive right of certain copyright 
holders when it sold subscribers a service allowing them to stream 
and watch television programs over the Internet at almost the same 
time as the programs were broadcast over the air.4 The plaintiff 
copyright owners included television producers, marketers, distributors, 
and broadcasters who owned the copyrights to many programs that 
Aereo’s system streamed to its subscribers.5 Plaintiffs brought suit 
seeking a preliminary injunction, arguing that Aereo was 
infringing on their right to “perform” their copyrighted works 
“publicly.”6 The Court looked to the Copyright Act, which grants 
owners the exclusive right to perform their copyrighted works 
publicly.7 The Court sought to determine: (1) whether Aereo’s 
system constitutes a performance under the meaning of the word as 
the act defines it, and if so, (2) whether that performance is public.8 
Relying heavily on congressional intent, the Court held that Aereo 
did perform the copyrighted works publicly and was thus liable for 
infringement.9 However, this decision was not unanimous. Justice 
Scalia authored a dissent, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, 
criticizing the majority’s ad hoc approach and offering a textual 
argument for applying a volitional-conduct test to determine 
defendant’s liability.10  
                                                                                                                                     
(holding that defendant ivi was not a cable system); Fox Television Stations, 
Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Systems, PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal 
2012) (granting a preliminary injunction to the broadcast network against 
BarryDriller’s system, which is very similar to Aereo’s system, in a copyright 
infringement claim). 
3 Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
4 Id. at 2503.  
5 Id.  
6 Id. at 2503–04.  
7 17 U.S.C § 106(4) (2012). 
8 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504.  
9 Id. at 2511. 
10 Id. at 2517. 
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 This Recent Development argues that the Court’s opinion 
misinterprets the Copyright Act. By using an ad hoc and 
ends-justify-the-means rationale, the majority gives too much 
discretion to lower courts in determining technically complex cases. 
The better approach is the dissent’s bright-line volitional-conduct 
analysis, which would provide courts with a clear way to interpret 
copyright cases involving complex technologies. Part II sets forth 
the facts of Aereo and prior development of the Copyright Act. 
Part III examines the majority’s rationale and proposes 
complications that will arise because of the majority’s approach. 
Part IV predicts the impact this holding will have on new 
technologies and Part V concludes with recommendations for how 
to address future cases of copyright infringement.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
 Aereo’s system operated by assigning each subscriber his own 
antenna, which transmitted a copy of the subscriber’s requested 
program to him via an Internet connection.11 In Aereo, the Supreme 
Court addressed whether Aereo’s system infringed on the 
television broadcasters’ exclusive right to publicly perform their 
works, as defined by the Copyright Act.12 The Copyright Act does 
not specifically address technology identical to that employed by 
Aereo, and similar systems have been subject to varying 
interpretations by lower courts.13  
A. The Specifics of Aereo’s Online Service 
Aereo’s system transmitted broadcast television programs to its 
subscribers over the Internet.14 Understanding of the specifics of 
Aereo’s operations is best achieved by looking at both the subscriber’s 
perspective and the technical, or “behind the scenes” perspective.15  
                                                            
11 See discussion infra Part II.A.  
12 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503.  
13 See discussion infra Part II.C.  
14 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 2013), rev’d, 
Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).  
15 Id.  
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From a subscriber’s point of view, Aereo provided the 
functionality of both a standard television and a DVR because 
Aereo’s system allowed subscribers to watch, record, and/or pause 
live television using an Internet-connected device.16 When a subscriber 
logged into his Aereo account, he could access a guide of 
broadcast television programs. 17  Depending upon whether the 
program had already aired, the subscriber could choose to either 
“Watch” or “Record” the selected program.18 If the subscriber 
choose to watch the program, he could pause, rewind, or record the 
program as he viewed the show.19 If the subscriber chose instead to 
record a program, Aereo saved a copy of that program for later 
viewing, which the subscriber could choose to playback at his 
convenience.20 The difference between the “Watch” and “Record” 
feature was that a program viewed with only the “Watch” function 
was not retained for later viewing.21  
From a technical perspective, Aereo’s system was comprised 
of servers, transcoders, and several large antenna boards housed in 
a central warehouse.22 Each board contained approximately eighty 
antennas, which consisted of two dime-sized metal loops.23 In total, 
thousands of such antennas spanned the warehouse.24 When an 
                                                            
16 Id. at 681–82 (“[U]sers can watch Aereo programming on a variety of 
devices. Aereo’s primary means of transmitting a program to a user is via an 
Internet browser, which users can access on their computers. Aereo users can 
also watch programs on mobile devices such as tablets or smart phones using 
mobile applications.”).  
17 Id. at 681.   
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
20 If a subscriber selects a program that will air in the future, the “Record” 
function is his only option. In this case, Aereo will record the program when it 
airs, saving a copy for the viewer to watch at his convenience. Id.  
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 682; Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 
(2014).   
23 WNET, 712 F.3d at 682 (noting that these antenna boards are installed 
parallel to each other in the warehouse in such a way that the antennas extend 
out in order to receive the television broadcast signals. Thus, Aereo’s facility 
uses thousands of individual antennas to receive the broadcast television 
signals.). 
24 Id. 
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Aereo subscriber selected a program to either watch or record, that 
selection sent a signal to Aereo’s server.25 The server initially 
assigned one of the individual antennas and a transcoder to the 
subscriber, and it tuned the antenna to the broadcast frequency of 
the requested program.26 The server next transcoded27 the data 
received by the antenna, buffered the data, and sent the data to 
another server where a copy of the program was saved in a 
subscriber-specific folder on Aereo’s hard drive.28 This process 
allowed Aereo to save a subscriber-specific copy of the program.29 
When the subscriber chose to only watch, and not record, his 
selected program, Aereo’s server began to stream the saved copy 
of the program after several seconds of the program had been 
saved.30 Once the program ended, if the subscriber had only chosen 
the “Watch” function, Aereo automatically deleted that copy of the 
program.31 If the subscriber only selected to record the program, 
the copy of the program was saved in the subscriber’s folder for 
later viewing.32 
                                                            
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014) 
(explaining that transcoding refers to the process in which signals received by 
the antenna are translated into data that can be transmitted over the Internet).   
28 WNET, 712 F.3d at 682–83. (“Three technical details of Aereo’s system 
merit further elaboration. First, Aereo assigns an individual antenna to each user. 
No two users share the same antenna at the same time, even if they are watching 
or recording the same program. Second, the signal received by each antenna is 
used to create an individual copy of the program in the user’s personal directory. 
Even when two users are watching or recording the same program, a separate 
copy of the program is created for each. Finally, when a user watches a program, 
whether nearly live or previously recorded, he sees his individual copy on his 
TV, computer, or mobile-device screen. Each copy of a program is only 
accessible to the user who requested that the copy be made, whether that copy is 
used to watch the program nearly live or hours after it has finished airing; no 
other Aereo user can ever view that particular copy.”).  
29 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503 (2014) (finding that rather than sending the 
program directly to the subscriber, “a server saves the data in a subscriber-specific 
folder on Aereo’s hard drive,” creating a personal copy of the program for 
subscriber”). 
30 Id.  
31 WNET, 712 F.3d at 682. 
32 Id.  
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B. Text of the Copyright Act  
Congress revised the 1909 Copyright Act in 1976, shortly after 
the Supreme Court issued two opinions addressing cable-television 
technology.33 In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television Inc.34 
and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,35 
the Supreme Court held that the cable television systems in 
question did not infringe on copyright holders’ rights because the 
systems did not “perform” the works as defined by the then-current 
1909 Copyright Act.36 In response to these holdings, Congress 
enacted the 1976 Copyright Act, which is still in effect today.37  
The 1976 Copyright Act grants the owner of a copyright 
various exclusive rights including the right to perform their work 
publicly.38 This section also gives the owner of a copyright the 
exclusive right to authorize another party to publicly perform their 
                                                            
33 Thomas M. Carter, The Copyright Act and the Frontier of “Television”: 
What to do About Aereo, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 97, 103–04 (2014) (citing 
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 685 (2d Cir. 2013)) (discussing 
the results of Fortnightly and Teleprompter, where the Supreme Court 
determined that there was no public performance because the 1909 Copyright 
Act did not contain a section comparable to the current Transmit Clause).  
34 392 U.S. 390 (1968). 
35 415 U.S. 394 (1974). 
36 Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 399–401; Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 408. See also 
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 685 (2d Cir. 2013), rev’d, Am. 
Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (“[The Fortnightly and 
Teleprompter] decisions held that under the then-current 1909 Copyright Act, 
which lacked any analog to the Transmit Clause, a cable television system that 
received broadcast television signals via antenna and retransmitted these signals 
to its subscribers via coaxial cable did not ‘perform’ the copyrighted works and 
therefore did not infringe copyright holders’ public performance right.”). 
37 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976) (“Under the definitions of ‘perform,’ 
‘display,’ ‘publicly,’ and ‘transmit’ in section 101, the concepts of public 
performance and public display cover not only the initial rendition or showing, 
but also any further act by which that rendition or showing is transmitted or 
communicated to the public. Thus, for example . . . a cable television system is 
performing when it retransmits the broadcast to its subscribers.”). See WNET, 
712 F.3d. at 685; 17 U.S.C. §§ 104, 111(d) (2012). 
38 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (“[T]he owner of a copyright under this title has 
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize . . . in the case of literary, musical, 
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly.”).  
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works.39 The Copyright Act further defines “perform” as “to recite, 
render, play, dance, or act, either directly or by means of any 
device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make 
the sounds accompanying it audible.”40 Congress added what is 
known as the “Transmit Clause” to the Copyright Act, which 
defines a public performance as transmitting or otherwise 
communicating a performance of a copyrighted work to the public 
by means of any device or process.41  
The Copyright Act also requires copyright holders and cable 
companies that retransmit the copyrighted works to enter into 
compulsory licensing agreements under § 111.42 Within this section, 
Congress defines cable systems that would be subject to these 
licensing agreements as any facility that receives transmitted 
signals or programs broadcasted by a Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”) licensed station and makes secondary 
transmissions of those signals to subscribing members of the 
public that pay for such service.43  
Today, the Copyright Act thus provides copyright holders the 
exclusive right to publicly perform their works. It also states that 
                                                            
39 Id. 
40 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
41 Id. (“To perform or display a work ‘publicly’ means . . . to transmit or 
otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place 
specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, 
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or 
display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or 
at different times.”) (emphasis added).   
42 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(1) (2012) (“[S]econdary transmissions to the public by a 
cable system of a performance or display of a work embodied in a primary 
transmission made by a broadcast station licensed by the Federal Communications 
Commission or by an appropriate governmental authority . . . shall be subject to 
statutory licensing”). 
43 17 U.S.C. § 111(f)(3) (2012) (“A ‘cable system’ is a facility, located in any 
State, territory, trust territory, or possession of the United States, that in whole 
or in part receives signals transmitted or programs broadcast by one or more 
television broadcast stations licensed by the Federal Communications 
Commission, and makes secondary transmissions of such signals or programs by 
wires, cables, microwave, or other communications channels to subscribing 
members of the public who pay for such service.”).  
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transmitting copyrighted works constitutes a performance, while 
providing a compulsory licensing scheme for providers that meet 
the Act’s definition of cable systems.  
C. Judicial Interpretations of the Copyright Act  
After the 1976 amendments, interpretation of the public 
performance right as applied to new and emerging technologies 
has varied by jurisdiction. For instance, in Cartoon Network LP, 
LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.44 (“Cablevision”), the Second Circuit 
held that defendant Cablevision’s new Remote Storage Digital 
Video Recorder system (“RS-DVR”) did not infringe on the 
copyright holder’s exclusive right to publicly perform their 
works.45 The RS-DVR system allowed Cablevision customers “to 
record cable programming on central hard drives housed and 
maintained by Cablevision at a ‘remote’ location. RS-DVR 
customers [could] then receive playback of those programs through 
their home television sets, using only a remote control and a 
standard cable box equipped with the RS-DVR software.”46 Thus, 
the RS-DVR service was much like a traditional DVR service, 
allowing customers to store recorded programs on an internal hard 
drive and play them back at their own convenience.47 However, 
there was one difference from traditional DVR services: instead of 
storing the copyrighted programs on an internal hard drive, the 
RS-DVR service would store the programs at a Cablevision 
facility.48 The Second Circuit concluded that each transmission was 
private because each individual subscriber made transmissions 
through his own personal copies.49 Since each transmission was 
private, the Second Circuit held that Cablevision could not be 
                                                            
44 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).  
45 Id. at 123.  
46 Id. at 124.   
47 Id. at 123–24.  
48 Id. at 124.  
49 Id. at 137–38 (finding that the “universe of people capable of receiving an 
RS-DVR transmission is the single subscriber whose self-made copy is used to 
create that transmission”).  
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publicly performing the copyrighted works and thus was not liable 
for copyright infringement.50  
In WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc.,51 the Second Circuit addressed whether 
ivi, which admitted to violating plaintiffs’ public performance 
rights, was a cable system entitled to the compulsory licensing fee 
under § 111 of the Copyright Act. 52 ivi’s system operated by 
capturing and retransmitting plaintiffs’ copyrighted television 
programs live over the Internet to its subscribers.53 The Second 
Circuit first examined the plain language of § 111, and finding it 
inconclusive regarding the Internet, then turned its focus to 
legislative intent.54  
In examining the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act, 
the Second Circuit found that Congress’s intent was not to include 
Internet transmissions under § 111’s licensing scheme.55 Specifically, 
the Second Circuit concluded that legislative history indicated that 
Congress enacted § 111 to address the issues of poor television 
reception in certain areas by allowing licensing programs that 
would support local systems to provide cable to these areas.56 The 
Second Circuit also acknowledged that if Congress had intended 
for the compulsory licensing agreements to apply to the Internet, it 
would have explicitly included such Internet transmissions in the 
                                                            
50 Id. at 139 (concluding that the RS-DVR “transmissions are not performances 
‘to the public,’ and therefore do not infringe any exclusive right of public 
performance”).  
51 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012).  
52 Id. at 278–79.  
53 Id. at 277–79 (noting that within 5 months after its launch, ivi offered over 
4,000 of plaintiffs’ copyrighted television programs to its subscribers).  
54 Id. at 280 (“Based on the statutory text alone, it is simply not clear whether 
a service that transmits television programming live and over the Internet 
constitutes a cable system under § 111.”).  
55 Id. at 282.  
56 Id. at 281 (citing U.S. Copyright Office, Satellite Home Viewer Extension 
and Reauthorization Act Section 109 Report 1 (2008) (“SHVERA Report”)) 
(concluding that Congress enacted § 111 to enable cable systems to provide 
service to more geographic areas while offering broadcasters protection to 
incentivize their continued broadcasts).  
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statute.57 Finally, the Second Circuit cited the Copyright Office’s 
statement “that Internet retransmission services are not cable systems 
and do not qualify for § 111 compulsory licenses.”58 Pursuant to its 
conclusion that ivi was not a cable system, the court upheld the 
injunction preventing ivi from streaming copyrighted programs.59  
Later that year, in American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. 
Aereo, Inc. 60  (“Aereo I”), the Southern District of New York 
applied Cablevision and held that Aereo did not infringe on the 
rights of copyright holders to publicly perform their works.61 
There, the court found that Aereo’s system, which allowed 
subscribers to view plaintiffs’ copyrighted works over the Internet, 
was analogous to Cablevision’s because each subscriber was 
assigned his own antenna, so it was not a public transmission.62 
Instead, each recording was made individually at each subscriber’s 
request.63  
Contrast Aereo I to a case decided later that same year, Fox 
Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDiller Content Systems, PLC.64 In 
BarryDriller, a California court had to determine whether BarryDriller’s 
system, which was similar to Aereo’s, infringed on the plaintiffs’ 
copyrighted works.65 In determining whether BarryDriller should 
be subject to a preliminary injunction, the district court noted the 
                                                            
57 See id. (noting that Congress codified a separate statutory license for 
satellite carries (the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1998) and also amended 
§ 111’s language in 1994 to expressly include microwaves).  
58 Id. at 283, (quoting U.S. Copyright Office, A Review of the Copyright 
Licensing Regimes Covering Retransmission of Broadcast Signals 97 (1997)). 
59 Id. at 285.  
60 874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).  
61 Id. at 375.   
62 Id. at 385–86 (“As in Cablevision, the functionality of Aereo’s system from 
the user’s perspective substantially mirrors that available using devices such as a 
DVR or Slingbox, which allow users to access free, over-the-air broadcast 
television on mobile internet devices of their choosing.”). 
63 Id. at 386.  
64 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal 2012).  
65 Id. at 1140–41 (“Plaintiffs accuse Defendants of offering their copyrighted 
content through internet and mobile device streaming. Defendants do not deny 
that they retransmit Plaintiffs’ copyrighted broadcast programming, but argue 
that their service is legal because it is technologically analogous to the service 
which the Southern District of New York found to be non-infringing.”).  
16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 1, 11 
ABC v. Aereo 
differing approaches taken by the Second Circuit and the Ninth 
Circuit in deciding infringement cases.66 The court refused to apply 
the Second Circuit’s approach, which held that transmissions of 
individual copies do not infringe on the public performance right.67 
Instead, the BarryDriller court focused on whether the defendant’s 
system was performing the work at all, irrespective of the specific 
copy of the work from which the transmission was made. 68 
Rejecting the Second Circuit’s approach, the court held that 
BarryDriller was infringing on Fox’s copyrighted works and 
granted a preliminary injunction.69 
The District of Columbia Circuit next decided Fox Television 
Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC,70 with Fox arguing that FilmOn 
should be held liable based on the BarryDriller decision.71 FilmOn 
responded that following Cablevision, its system was not liable for 
copyright infringement because it does not publicly perform the 
copyrighted works.72 The district court decided for Fox, acknowledging 
that although it was not bound by either the Second Circuit’s 
decisions or California’s BarryDriller ruling, it “f[ound] BarryDriller 
to be more persuasive.”73 In concluding that the Copyright Act 
                                                            
66 Id. at 1145 (“The Second Circuit’s focus is also in tension with precedent in 
the Ninth Circuit.”).  
67 Id. at 1144 (characterizing the Second Circuit’s reasoning as “unless the 
transmission itself is public, the transmitter has not infringed the public performance 
right”).  
68 Id. (“Again the concern is with the performance of the copyrighted work, 
irrespective of which copy of the work the transmission is made from.”). 
69 Id. at 1149.  
70 966 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2013).  
71 Id. at 32.  
72 Id. FilmOn specifically responded that its system was modeled after the 
approved system from the Cablevision decision. It assigned each subscriber an 
individual antenna, thus creating a one-to-one relationship. FilmOn asserted that 
this process did not infringe on the plaintiffs’ exclusive right to publicly perform 
its copyrighted works and so it was not liable for copyright infringement. Id. 
73 Id. at 33 (“The Court has carefully considered the rulings in Cablevision 
and Aereo II, but it is not bound by them or by the California court's ruling in 
BarryDriller, although the Court finds BarryDriller to be more persuasive.”). 
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prohibits FilmOn’s retransmission services, the court granted a 
preliminary injunction against its services.74 
Despite these two consecutive findings of infringement in the 
Ninth and D.C. Circuits, in WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo,75 the Second 
Circuit applied Cablevision’s interpretation of the Transmit Clause 
and held that Aereo was not liable for infringement.76 In applying 
Cablevision, the Second Circuit used a four-part inquiry to 
determine whether to award a preliminary injunction.77 First, it 
considered the potential audience of the transmission.78 Second, it 
recognized the rule that private transmissions should not be 
aggregated.79 Third, it acknowledged an exception to the second 
rule, finding that private transmissions generated from the same 
copy of the work may be aggregated.80 Finally, it accepted any 
other factor that limited the potential audience of a transmission as 
a relevant fact to the Transmit Clause analysis.81 Using these four 
guidelines, the Second Circuit determined Aereo’s system was 
analogous to the RS-DVR system in Cablevision and thus not 
liable for infringement.82 Aereo’s potential audience was the single 
user who requested the program to be recorded, and thus it was not 
                                                            
74 Id. (“This Court concludes that the Copyright Act forbids FilmOn X from 
retransmitting Plaintiffs’ copyrighted programs over the Internet. Plaintiffs are 
thus likely to succeed on their claim that FilmOn X violates Plaintiffs’ exclusive 
public performance rights in their copyrighted works. Because there is no 
dispute of fact between the parties . . . the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion for 
a preliminary injunction.”). 
75 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013).  
76 Id. at 696. 
77 Id. at 689.  
78 Id. (acknowledging “if the potential audience of the transmission is only 
one subscriber, the transmission is not a public performance, except as discussed 
[in subsequent factors]”). 
79 Id. (“It is therefore irrelevant to the Transmit Clause analysis whether the 
public is capable of receiving the same underlying work or original performance 
of the work by means of many transmissions.”).  
80 Id. (“In such cases, these private transmissions should be aggregated, and if 
these aggregated transmissions from a single copy enable the public to view that 
copy, the transmission are public performances.”).  
81 Id. (quoting Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 
536 F.3d 121, 137 (2d Cir. 2008)).  
82 See id. at 690. 
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a public transmission.83 Like the RS-DVR service, Aereo created 
unique copies of every program an individual subscriber wished to 
perform.84 Additionally, when an Aereo user chose to watch a 
program, the transmission he viewed was generated from his 
unique copy; no other user received that copy.85  
Judge Chin authored a dissent calling Aereo’s technology “a 
sham” and “over-engineered in an attempt to avoid the reach of the 
Copyright Act and to take advantage of a perceived loophole in the 
law.” 86  In reaching his conclusion, Judge Chin examined the 
statutory text of the Copyright Act and the legislative intent in 
enacting the Transmit Clause,87 finding a critical difference between 
Aereo’s and Cablevision’s services: Cablevision’s underlying cable 
system was authorized.88 Cablevision paid statutory licensing and 
retransmission fees and its subscribers were able to view television 
programs in real-time.89 The only issue in Cablevision was the 
supplemental RS-DVR service, which allowed subscribers to store 
the already authorized programs for later viewing.90 Judge Chin’s 
dissent highlighted how this difference created a stark contrast to 
Aereo’s system, as Aereo paid no fees and its retransmissions were 
unauthorized.91   
 
 
                                                            
83 Id. at 689–90.  
84 Id.   
85 Id. at 690. 
86 Id. at 697 (Chin, J. dissenting) (“The system employs thousands of individual 
dime-sized antennas, but there is no technologically sound reason to use a 
multitude of tiny individual antennas rather than one central antenna; indeed, the 
system is a Rube Goldberg-like contrivance, over-engineered in an attempt to 
avoid the reach of the Copyright Act and to take advantage of a perceived 
loophole in the law.”).  
87  Id. at 698 (Chin, J., dissenting) (finding explicitly that to transmit a 
performance is to communicate it by any device or process, so Aereo’s system 
fit squarely within the statute’s plain meaning).  
88 See id. at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting).  
89 Id. at 701 (Chin, J., dissenting).   
90 Id. (Chin, J., dissenting).   
91 Id. at 702 (Chin, J., dissenting).  
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III.  THE MAJORITY’S FLAWED RATIONALE FOR ITS HOLDING 
Judicial interpretation and application of the Transmit Clause 
to Internet-streaming services has resulted in two conflicting 
views, namely the Second Circuit approach, which focused on the 
potential audience capable of receiving the transmission, and the 
Ninth Circuit approach, which focused on whether the allegedly 
infringing service “performed” at all. The Supreme Court’s grant 
of certiorari in Aereo gave hope that the Court would provide 
guidance and bring clarity to this area of copyright law, but 
unfortunately its rationale only further confuses this issue. In 
deciding this case, the Court looked to two separate questions 
under the Copyright Act: (1) whether Aereo performed, and (2) if 
so, whether the performance was public.92  
A. Did Aereo Perform Publicly as Defined by the Copyright Act? 
The majority in Aereo determined that Aereo did perform as 
defined by the Copyright Act.93 First, the majority acknowledged 
that the congressional intent in enacting the 1976 amendments was 
“to bring the activities of cable systems within the scope of the 
Copyright Act.”94 The Court then held that Aereo was not just an 
equipment provider, but rather that its “activities [were] 
substantially similar to those of the CATV companies that 
Congress amended the [Copyright] Act to reach.”95 In coming to 
this conclusion, the Court acknowledged that the systems at issue 
in both Teleprompter and Fortnightly—the two Court cases that 
preceded Congress’s passage of the 1976 Copyright Act—varied in 
one significant aspect from Aereo: those systems transmitted 
copyrighted material constantly while Aereo’s system only transmitted 
broadcasted programs when requested by a subscriber.96 However, 
the Court disregarded this difference, finding instead that because 
of “Aereo’s overwhelming likeness to the cable companies targeted 
by the 1976 amendments, this sole technological difference between 
                                                            
92 Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2504 (2014).  
93 Id. (“We conclude that Aereo is not just an equipment supplier and that 
Aereo ‘perform[s].’”).  
94 Id. at 2506. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 2507. 
16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 1, 15 
ABC v. Aereo 
Aereo and traditional cable companies does not make a critical 
difference here.”97 Accordingly, the Court held Aereo’s program to 
constitute a performance.98  
The majority built their opinion upon a foundation of flawed 
reasoning. One major flaw is the majority’s dismissive conclusion 
that Aereo’s system constituted a performance within the meaning 
of the Copyright Act. The majority seemingly substitutes actual 
interpretation of the statutory text with a conclusion based upon a 
“guilt by resemblance”99 analysis.100 By concluding that Aereo was 
similar to a cable company without actually classifying it as one 
subject to the § 111 compulsory licensing agreements, the majority’s 
reasoning seems to be based almost entirely on the view that 
Aereo’s system was similar to the original cable television systems 
Congress sought to regulate through the 1976 amendments. Based 
on this looks-like-cable-TV standard, the majority concluded that 
because Aereo looked like a cable system, it should be held liable 
for infringement.101  
Nothing in the plain language of the Copyright Act indicates 
that Aereo’s program was illegal. For copyright infringement, parties 
may be guilty of infringing on a theory of direct or secondary 
liability.102 In direct liability cases, the defendant engages in the 
infringing conduct.103 In contrast, secondary liability occurs when a 
                                                            
97 Id. (“Insofar as there are differences [between Aereo and the original cable 
television systems in Fortnightly and Teleprompter], those differences concern 
not the nature of the service that Aereo provides so much as the technological 
manner in which it provides the service.”).  
98 Id.   
99 Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
100 The majority examined the congressional intent of the 1976 amendments to 
the Copyright Act, and found that these changes were made to bring activities of 
cable systems within the scope of the Act. The majority then determined that 
Aereo’s activities were “substantially similar to those of CATV companies that 
Congress amended the Act to reach” and used this reasoning to find that Aereo’s 
activities constituted a performance within the meaning of the Transmit Clause. 
Id. at 2506.  
101 Id. at 2517 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
102 Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984)).  
103 See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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defendant is held liable for infringement by a third party even if the 
defendant was not a party to the infringing activities.104 In Aereo, 
American Broadcasting Company (“ABC”) claimed that Aereo was 
directly infringing on their copyrighted works, so Aereo should 
have been found liable only if it met the standard of direct 
infringement.105  
Aereo should not have been held liable for copyright infringement 
because it did not meet the standard of direct infringement. This 
standard is met “only if [Aereo had] engaged in volitional conduct 
that violates the Act.” 106  Such volitional conduct requires the 
defendant to have directed its conduct to the copyrighted 
material.107 The language of the Copyright Act directly supports 
this proposition, as demonstrated by its consistent use of the active 
voice in describing an infringer’s actions directed towards the 
copyrighted work.108 The question in this case is who is responsible 
for performing the copyrighted work: Aereo or its subscribers?109  
In using Aereo’s services, the subscribers performed the copyright 
holders’ copyrighted works.110 Aereo’s system responded to the 
                                                            
104 Secondary liability applies when a defendant “intentionally induc[es] or 
encourage[s] infringing acts by others or profits from such acts while declining 
to exercise a right to stop or limit [them].” Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 
930 (2005)). 
105 Id. at 2514–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[The Network’s] request for a 
preliminary injunction—the only issue before this Court—is based exclusively 
on the direct-liability portion of the public performance claim.”) (citing App. to 
Pet. for Cert. 60a-61a).   
106 Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 3 W. PATRY, COPYRIGHT §9:5.50 
(2013)).  
107 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting “[e]very Court of Appeals to have considered 
an automated-service provider’s direct liability for copyright infringement has 
adopted that rule”).  
108 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the Act “defines ‘perform’ in active, 
affirmative terms”).  
109 Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
110 Id. at 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he key point is that 
subscribers call all the shots”).  
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subscriber’s program request: its servers, transcoders, and antennas 
were indifferent to the material that is transmitted.111  
In order to be liable for direct infringement, the volitional-conduct 
standard requires that Aereo must have “trespassed on the 
exclusive domain of the copyright owner” itself.112 The dissent 
illustrates this requirement by explaining the core difference 
between a copy-shop and a video-on-demand service.113 In copy 
shops, the customer chooses the material to be copied, so the shop 
cannot be held liable if a customer makes an infringing copy.114 In 
contrast, a video-on-demand service, such as Netflix, chooses and 
arranges available materials for its subscribers. This arrangement 
by Netflix constitutes a volitional act.115 Aereo differs from Netflix 
because it did not provide subscribers with a prearranged assortment 
of programs.116 Instead, Aereo assigned each subscriber his own 
antenna, and the subscriber chose to use that antenna to access 
whatever broadcasts were available over the air, some of which 
were copyrighted and others which were not.117 Since Aereo did 
not select the content of the programs to be transmitted, it should 
not be held liable for directly infringing on ABC’s copyrights.  
Another difference highlighted by the Netflix analogy is that 
video-on-demand services perform “to the public,” while Aereo 
did not. After Netflix selects the works it wants to perform, it 
purchases copies of those works and transmits the copy to its 
subscribers upon request.118 When different subscribers choose the 
same video, they receive an individual transmission of that work, 
but when Netflix generates that transmission from the same single 
copy that Netflix purchased.119 Thus, although the specific transmission 
                                                            
111 See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 682 (2d Cir. 2013), 
rev’d, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).   
112 CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550–51 (4th Cir. 2004).  
113 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2513 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
114 Id.  
115 Id.  
116 Id. at 2514. 
117 Id. See also WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 682 (2d Cir. 
2013), rev’d, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).   
118 See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2513 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
119 Brief of 36 Intellectual Property and Copyright Law Professors as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 28, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 
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to each subscriber is private, Netflix uses one copy to transmit the 
same program to numerous different subscribers. In contrast, each 
of Aereo’s transmissions was an individual program copy that Aereo 
made upon user requests.120  
The finding that Aereo’s subscribers, rather than Aereo itself, 
performed does not mean that Aereo can escape secondary 
infringement. In fact, the Court should hold Aereo liable for this 
offense. But because the issue before the Court was only that of 
direct liability, the Court should not have found Aereo liable for 
copyright infringement through performing.121  
B. Uncertainty Created by the Finding that Aereo is Performing 
Publicly  
The dissent summarized the flaws in the majority’s holding 
with the following syllogism: “(1) Congress amended the Act to 
overrule our decisions holding that cable systems do not perform 
when they retransmit over-the-air broadcasts; (2) Aereo looks a lot 
like a cable system; therefore (3) Aereo performs.”122 This rationale 
injects uncertainty into future cases of copyright infringement by 
contradicting settled jurisprudence of the bright-line volitional-conduct 
test and by providing little criteria for determining future cases.123  
The majority’s rationale was that because Aereo was similar to 
a cable system, the majority should treat it as such to determine 
                                                                                                                                     
134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461) (“In a video-on-demand service like 
Netflix, the provider chooses audiovisual works, obtains copies of those works, 
and offers to transmit performances of those works to any person agreeing to the 
provider's terms. Numerous subscribers receive individual transmissions of the 
same work generated at different times from the same copy.”).  
120 See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text.  
121 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2514–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
122 Id.  
123 See, e.g., CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 
2004) (“But to establish direct liability . . . [t]here must be actual infringing 
conduct with a nexus sufficiently close and causal to the illegal copying that one 
could conclude that the machine owner himself trespassed on the exclusive 
domain of the copyright owner.”); see also Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).  
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whether it performs.124 Even accepting that rule, the Court has 
provided no guidance for which factors contribute to determining 
what qualifies as a cable-lookalike system.125 Does the program in 
question have to store live broadcasts for future viewing at the 
user’s discretion? Based on the ruling in Cablevision, this could 
not be the standard, otherwise the RS-DVR service would also be 
infringing.126 Alternatively, the proper criteria could be that if the 
program offers access to live broadcasts via the Internet, it 
constitutes performance. However, this also does not seem to be a 
good working basis because of the potential for Aereo to simply 
require users to wait a few minutes or more before streaming the 
program to them.127  
Based on these uncertainties, the test the Court seems to be 
proposing is an ad hoc test to determine whether the totality of the 
circumstances would indicate that a cable-like service is being 
provided.128 However, that still leaves uncertainty in regards to the 
traditional volitional-conduct requirements. Would this new ad hoc 
test replace the bright-line volition test or would each stand alone, 
based upon the discretion of the court hearing the case?  
The majority’s refusal to provide a clear working standard for 
interpreting and applying the Transmit Clause to new technologies 
creates great uncertainty for determining future cases. The majority 
acknowledged that its holding would affect future cases, yet chose 
to ignore these implications.129 It instead deferred that decision to a 
later date, when a specific new technology comes before the 
                                                            
124 Aereo, 134 S. Ct at 2511 (finding that Aereo’s practices were “highly 
similar to those of CATV systems in Fortnightly and Teleprompter,” and as 
such, they are within the scope of the Transmit Clause).   
125 Id. at 2516 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
126 Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 
121 (2d Cir. 2008).  
127 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2516 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
128 Id. at 2517 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“That leaves as the criterion of 
cable-TV-resemblance nothing but th’ol’ totality-of-the-circumstances test 
(which is not a test at all but merely assertion of an intent to perform test-free, 
ad hoc, case-by-case evaluation).”).  
129 Id. at 2511.   
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Court.130 Specifically, the majority stated that questions involving 
novel issues, such as cloud technology, “should await a case in 
which they are squarely presented.”131 The Court has seemingly 
punted the issues to lower courts to decide how to interpret future 
copyright cases that fall outside the limited holding of the cable-
lookalike standard the majority proposed here. The Court’s 
decision to defer future technologies to a later date is problematic 
because it allows for this ongoing uncertainty in interpreting the 
Copyright Act to persist on a case-by-case basis.  
IV.  IMPLICATIONS ON NEW TECHNOLOGY  
Today, technology plays a vital role in society with advances 
created at a constant and rapid pace. The Aereo decision is 
important for providing guidelines to interpret the Copyright Act in 
light of new technologies. Both of the parties from Aereo 
addressed this argument, but the majority responded only by 
declaring, “[w]e cannot now answer more precisely how the 
Transmit Clause or other provisions of the Copyright Act will 
apply to technologies not before us.”132 The majority acknowledged 
that questions regarding emerging technologies would inevitably 
arise, but instead of addressing these questions and providing a 
standard for future courts to work with, the majority chose to 
ignore this issue. 133  Accordingly, when determining copyright 
liability for new technologies, future courts will have to apply the 
majority’s reasoning to various technologies, even those that do 
not fall into the majority’s “cable-lookalike” standard. This will 
negatively impact the development and application of novel 
technologies.   
A. Effects on Cloud Computing  
Cloud computing is an Internet-based system in which different 
services, including networks, servers, storage, and applications, are 
                                                            
130 Id. (“We cannot now answer more precisely how the Transmit Clause or 
other provisions of the Copyright Act will apply to technologies not before us.”). 
131 Id.   
132 Id.  
133 Id.  
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delivered to various devices and users via the Internet.134 It allows 
hardware to be moved off-site while retaining access through an 
Internet connection, and is already in wide use nationally. Users 
are able to access, share, and edit their stored data anywhere.135 The 
virtual services offered through the cloud have shown measurable 
economic value by creating thousands of new jobs and providing 
trillions of dollars in increased revenues.136  
Unfortunately, this important, growing industry is threatened 
by the Court’s Aereo decision. For example, many individuals 
currently use cloud services, such as Dropbox,137 to store their data. 
Individual users store their data with Dropbox, and can 
subsequently retrieve it at any time and place of their choosing. 
Some of the users may even use Dropbox to store data identical to 
that of other users, such as a copy of a television program, but each 
user will have his own copy saved to his own Dropbox folder. Like 
the programs transmitted by Aereo, Dropbox stores data in 
different files, each for a specific user. When requested by an 
individual user, Dropbox transmits the stored data to that user. 
                                                            
134 Peter Mell & Timothy Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, 
NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL 
PUB’N 800-145t 2 (2011), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/ 
800-145/SP800-145.pdf. (“Cloud computing offers ubiquitous, convenient, 
on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources 
(e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly 
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider 
interaction.”).  
135 Sand Hill Group, Job Growth in the Forecast: How Cloud Computing is 
Generating New Business Opportunities and Fueling Job Growth in the United 
States, at 13 (2012), available at http://www.news-sap.com/files/Job-Growth-in-
the-Forecast-012712.pdf.  
136 John F. Gantz, et al., Cloud Computing's Role in Job Creation, at 2, IDC 
White Paper (2012), available at http://people.uwec.edu/HiltonTS/ITConf2012/ 
NetApp2012Paper.pdf (“For businesses, cloud computing has the potential to 
create $1.1 trillion in revenue per year by 2015.”); Sand Hill Group, supra note 
135, at 13 (“And for American workers, cloud computing has the potential to 
create 685,000 jobs over the next 5 years, on top of the nearly 80,000 U.S. jobs 
that were created as a result of cloud computing in 2010 alone.”).  
137 There are various other such cloud storage technologies that provide the 
same function as Dropbox, and all are similarly endangered by the majority’s 
Aereo holding. The author only refers to Dropbox in this section of the paper for 
simplicity’s sake.  
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Dropbox is also indifferent to the content uploaded. Accordingly, a 
user may upload an illegally obtained copy of a television program 
to Dropbox access it later for viewing.  
By refusing to differentiate between cloud technologies such as 
Dropbox and cable systems similar to Aereo, the majority allows 
the possibility for cloud technologies to fall victim to the same ad 
hoc judgment of liability for direct copyright infringement. The 
majority’s conclusion that Aereo directly infringed on ABC’s 
copyrighted works was based on its finding that Aereo’s program 
was similar to the cable television systems that Congress sought to 
bring within the scope of the 1976 Copyright Act. 138  This 
conclusion allows lower courts, in making future decisions 
regarding cloud computing, to use the same totality of the 
circumstances judgment as that used by the Aereo majority.139 In 
such a case, a lower court could easily determine that like Aereo, 
Dropbox publicly performs copyrighted works. 
An example using a copyrighted television program 
demonstrates this prediction. In such a case, an individual would 
decide he wanted to watch a copyrighted program and could 
download it in a variety of legal ways. Instead of saving that 
program to his device’s personal hard drive, the user could upload 
it to Dropbox for storage and access it when he desired. Another 
individual deciding to download the same program, but through 
illegal means, could also upload his copy to Dropbox for storage. 
When either user wanted to watch the stored program at a later 
time, he or she could log in to his or her respective Dropbox 
account and access the stored program. The program viewed by 
                                                            
138 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 251 (“In sum, having considered the details of Aereo’s 
practices, we find them highly similar to those of the CATV systems in 
Fortnightly and Teleprompter. And those are activities that the 1976 
amendments sought to bring within the scope of the Copyright Act. Insofar as 
there are differences, those differences concern not the nature of the service that 
Aereo provides so much as the technological manner in which it provides the 
service. We conclude that those differences are not adequate to place Aereo’s 
activities outside the scope of the Act.”).  
139 As discussed supra in Part IV, the Aereo majority explicitly stated that it 
expected there to be questions of cloud computing in the future but chose to 
defer these questions to a time when a specific case involving that technology 
would come before the court. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511.  
16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 1, 23 
ABC v. Aereo 
each user will be his own copy which he uploaded to Dropbox, and 
even though the programs are identical, the first user will only 
have access to his legally obtained program while the second user 
will have access only to his illegally obtained program.  
This scenario is very similar to that which Aereo proscribes, 
and following the majority’s Aereo rationale, Dropbox could be 
held liable for direct infringement. First, a court deciding 
Dropbox’s case would need to determine whether or not Dropbox 
performs within the meaning of the Copyright Act. Following the 
majority rationale, the deciding court would consider whether 
Dropbox fits the cable-lookalike standard that the majority noted 
as a determinative factor in Aereo.140 However, without specific 
guidelines for determining what this standard really entails, there is 
room for interpretation. Although Dropbox’s primary function is to 
offer users a cloud-based storage service and not to provide users 
access to broadcast programs, the fact that customers can use the 
program to stream broadcast programs could provide a lower court 
with a basis for finding that Dropbox is performing. This 
possibility is dangerous because it allows for useful cloud 
computing technologies to fall victim to direct copyright 
infringement, which would result in a chilling effect on the 
development of such technologies that have already had, and 
continue to have, beneficial effects on our economy.  
The traditional volitional-conduct test that the Aereo dissent 
endorses is a better approach to this hypothetical. This approach 
gives courts clear guidance in applying the Copyright Act to 
different technologies rather than forcing them to interpret the 
Copyright Act in light of each new technology. With the Dropbox 
example, a court need only ask whether Dropbox’s service has 
engaged in volitional conduct directed towards copyrighted 
material. Here, the answer is unequivocally no. Dropbox only 
provides its users cloud-storage facilities and is indifferent to the 
data content that its users store. Finding that Dropbox does not 
perform under the volitional-conduct test, a court need not decide 
                                                            
140 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2507 (noting “Aereo’s overwhelming likeness to the 
cable companies targeted by the 1976 amendments,” as a determinative factor in 
finding Aereo liable).  
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whether such performance is public. This explicit guideline 
provides courts with a standard to apply, ensures uniformity in 
copyright interpretation in new technologies, and avoids costly 
litigation that comes with the majority’s ad hoc approach.  
The importance of cloud technology to society is undisputed. It 
is a digital service that is already in high demand and has the 
potential for significant economic growth.141 The continued growth 
of cloud computing however depends on an interpretation of the 
Copyright Act that does not threaten cloud services with costly 
litigation that accompanies direct infringement suits. By refusing 
to explicitly hold that cloud services are not subject to the same 
subjective cable-lookalike test established in Aereo, the majority 
created the potential for future confusion in interpreting the 
Transmit Clause to cloud computing technology.   
B. Growing Market for Aereo-Like Services 
 The traditional cable industry is a generally anticompetitive 
market, with only one or two companies dominating any specific 
geographic region.142 The lack of choice in cable providers has 
forced many consumers to obtain services through these 
providers,143 despite their consistent ranking at the bottom of the 
American Consumer Satisfaction Index.144 In such a market, many 
consumers would welcome an alternative to traditional cable 
companies. The FCC even favors such consumer autonomy, 
evidenced by its published guidelines detailing how consumers can 
                                                            
141 See Gantz et al., supra note 136, at 2.  
142 John Cassidy, We Need Real Competition, Not a Cable-Internet Monopoly, 
THE NEW YORKER, February 13, 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-
comment/we-need-real-competition-not-a-cable-internet-monopoly.  
143 Id. (“In some big cities, broadband consumers have a choice between a 
cable operator, such as Comcast, and a telephone provider, such as Verizon. But 
that’s practically no choice at all.”).  
144 Brief of Amici Curiae The Consumer Federation of America and the 
Consumers Union in Support of Respondent at 14, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. 
Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461) (“The ACSI rates consumer 
satisfaction using a model that includes such factors as the reasonableness of 
pricing, the availability of features, and the quality of customer service. Cable 
providers have earned a reputation for being unresponsive to customer demand 
and heedless of customer complaints.”). 
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access free over-the-air broadcast signals.145 To take advantage of 
these over-the-air signals, consumers must purchase their own 
home equipment, which averages about $700.146 In addition to the 
initial equipment cost, customers are responsible for installing and 
maintaining these systems, which many consumers lack the 
technical ability to do. 
By providing a service that allows users to view broadcasted 
programs without subscribing to a cable company, Aereo 
capitalized on the growing “cable cutting” market. This market 
comprises of consumers who have found alternative ways to view 
television programs without paying for a cable subscription.147 One 
of the greatest selling points of the cable cutting industry is the low 
cost. Although consumers still needed an Internet connection, 
Aereo’s service cost only $8 per month.148 Similar services are 
comparable in price with Netflix costing only $8.99 per month for 
new members.149 These prices are significantly lower than the 
average cable bill, which was reported to be $64.41 per month.150 
                                                            
145 See Installing Consumer-Owned Antennas and Satellite Dishes, FCC (last 
reviewed Mar. 11, 2014), available at http://www.fcc.gov/guides/installing-
consumer-owned-antennas-and-satellite-dishes.  
146 See Brief of Amici Curiae The Consumer Federation of America and the 
Consumers Union in Support of Respondent at 19, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. 
Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461) (noting that such equipment 
includes “high-definition [over-the-air] antenna, a DVR-type system, an external 
hard drive, and a Slingbox or similar device to watch shows on multiple 
devices”).  
147  Julie Borna, Aereo: Cutting the Cord or Splitting the Circuit?, 22 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 287, 306 (2014) (noting that reasons for “cable 
cutting” include having neither the time nor the money to watch the hundreds of 
channels that come with a monthly cable subscription) (citing Gerry Smith, My 
Year Using Aereo: How a Dime-Sized Antenna Met My TV Needs, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gerry-smith/my-year-
using-aereo_b_3745981.html).  
148 Id. at 290.  
149 In May 2014, Netflix announced it was raising the cost of its subscription 
from $7.99 to $8.99 per month for new members, but grandfathered in the $7.99 
price for current members for two years. See Dino Grandoni, Netflix Raises 
Price by $1 for New Customers, HUFFINGTON POST (May 9, 2014), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/09/netflix-price-increase_n_5294450.html.  
150 Christopher Zara, Cable Bills Rising: Amid Comcast-TWC Merger Scrutiny, 
FCC Media Bureau Report Shows Pay-TV Price Hikes Outpacing Inflation, 
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However, Aereo provided unique services that Netflix and other 
similar providers, such as Hulu Plus and Amazon, do not: Aereo 
allowed subscribers to watch programs nearly-live and gave access 
to live sports broadcasts.151  
 The success of Aereo, prior to the Court’s decision, and other 
similar services demonstrates that there is a true market for 
cable-television alternatives. In fact, both HBO and CBS have 
recently announced plans to offer Internet streaming of their live 
programs as well as past shows on demand. 152  These recent 
announcements demonstrate that cable companies are noticing and 
responding to a shift away from traditional cable packages and 
towards more convenient, on-demand, and cost effective Internet-
streaming options.  
 By holding that Aereo performed copyrighted works, the 
majority chills the development of services that threaten the 
traditional anticompetitive cable television market. Although a 
movement away from the cable market continues, as evidenced by 
CBS and HBO’s recent Internet-streaming option and the growing 
numbers of “cable cutters,” most Internet-based television 
providers do not offer the ability to watch programs online in 
real-time or to watch live sports programs. Aereo, in contrast, 
offered both. If the majority held instead that Aereo’s program did 
not constitute a performance, its operations would have been 
allowed to continue, and would have motivated the anticompetitive 
cable monopolies to respond. Such a response would have 
benefitted consumers, most likely by lowering costs, providing 
more varied package options, or simply improving their customer 
services.153   
                                                                                                                                     
INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 20, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.com/cable-bills-rising-
amid-comcast-twc-merger-scrutiny-fcc-media-bureau-report-shows-pay-tv-1587304.  
151 See Borna, supra note 147 and accompanying text. (“‘[T]o watch most 
sports, I just need the major networks,’ and that’s exactly what Aereo provides.”).  
152 However, the new CBS service notably does not offer NFL games. Emily 
Steel, Cord-Cutters Rejoice: CBS Joins Web Stream, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/17/business/cbs-to-offer-web-subscription-
service.html?_r=1.  
153  An example of how competition improves this market is visible in 
Google’s introduction of Google Fiber to Kansas City. There, Time Warner 
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V.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The majority’s holding that Aereo is directly liable for 
copyright infringement injects confusion into future Copyright Act 
interpretations. To remedy this uncertainty, (1) Congress can 
respond by enacting new legislation to specifically address services 
such as Aereo’s, (2) lower courts can find Aereo to be subject to 
the compulsory licensing scheme of § 111, or (3) the FCC can 
propose its own remedy, as it is an agency that commonly 
regulates cable-provider technologies.  
A. How Congress Can Fix Aereo 
In cases of new and emerging technologies, the courts should 
defer “to Congress when major technological innovations alter the 
market for copyrighted materials.”154 If the majority had applied 
the volitional-conduct test in Aereo, its rationale would have 
conformed to prior jurisprudence, and validated the Second 
Circuit’s interpretation as the correct standard in these Transmit 
Clause cases. That, in turn, would have allowed Congress to step in 
and address the issue of online streaming and copyright 
infringement. Instead, the Court chose to find infringement by an 
ad hoc “guilt by resemblance” test. 155 That decision provides little 
guidance for lower courts in deciding future cases.  
The Legislature is the branch of government best suited to 
introduce new interpretation of the Copyright Act in relation to 
novel technologies. In the past, Congress has not hesitated to act 
when it believed a new innovation required a new legal 
interpretation. For example, when the Eleventh Circuit held that a 
satellite carrier was a cable system entitled to § 111 compulsory 
licensing, Congress responded by codifying a separate statutory 
                                                                                                                                     
Cable almost immediately doubled its Internet speeds and offered up to seventy 
percent reductions in prices. See Lauren K. Ohnesorge, Will Google Fiber Mean 
Lower-Cost Time Warner Cable Service?, CHARLOTTE BUS. J. (Feb. 21, 2014), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/blog/morning-edition/2014/02/will-
google-fiber-mean-lower-cost-time-warner.html.  
154 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 
(1984). 
155 Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2515 (2014) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting).  
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licensing provision for satellite carriers. 156  More recently, the 
House Judiciary Committee Chairman announced the initiation of 
a comprehensive review of U.S. copyright law, paying particular 
attention to updates necessary in light of new technologies.157 
Additionally, several legislative proposals before Congress would 
alter the legal structure at issue here.158 One such proposal is the 
Consumer Choice in Online Video Act, which expressly permits 
equipment rental like that offered by Aereo, while exempting such 
rental services from certain retransmission fees.159  
The efforts taken by Congress in the past to remedy improper 
legal classification of technologies demonstrate its capability in 
this field of law. Its current review of national copyright law and 
its present consideration of several legislative bills addressing 
systems similar to Aereo’s demonstrate that Congress recognizes 
the importance of these issues. As such, Congress should either 
enact new legislation, like it did for satellite carriers, or amend the 
current legislation to explicitly address this issue.  
 
                                                            
156 WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 281 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing The 
Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 119).   
157 Press Release, House Judiciary Committee, Chairman Goodlatte Announces 
Comprehensive Review of Copyright Law (Apr. 24, 2013), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/2013/4/chairmangoodlatteannouncescompr
ehensivereviewofcopyrightlaw.   
158 Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Cable Ass’n in Support of Respondent at 34, 
Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461) 
(noting that some examples of legislation that would address retransmission 
rules include the Next Generation Television Marketing Act (H.R. 3720), 
Television Consumer Freedom Act of 2013 (S.912), and the Video Consumers 
have Options in Choosing Entertainment Act (“Video CHOICE Act”) of 2013 
(H.R. 3719)).  
159 The Consumer Choice in Online Video Act, (S. 1680), 113th Cong. (2013) 
(providing the legislation would “[p]ermit[] antenna rental services to rent to a 
consumer access to an individual antenna to view over-the-air broadcast 
television signals transmitted directly to: (1) the consumer over the Internet or 
another IP-based transmission path; or (2) an individual data storage system, 
including an online remote system, for recording and then made accessible to 
that consumer through an IP-based path. Exempts such antenna rental services 
from certain retransmission consent fees.”)  
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B. Specifically Addressing Internet Services within § 111 
By holding Aereo liable for copyright infringement because it 
resembles the cable television services Congress sought to bring 
under the scope of the Transmit Clause, without actually defining 
it as a cable system within § 111,160 the Court injects uncertainty 
into future Copyright Act interpretation. 
A solution to this problem is to include Internet transmissions 
of broadcasted programs as cable systems within the meaning of 
§ 111. The easiest way for courts to achieve this inclusion would 
be to interpret such Internet transmissions as a “facility” within the 
definition of cable systems.161 Unfortunately, the Copyright Office 
has expressly refused to classify Internet services as cable systems 
so they might receive the § 111 statutory licenses.162 Since the 
Copyright Office is an expert to be respected in this area, future 
courts will have a difficult time disregarding the Copyright 
Office’s express assertion and reading in a definition of Internet 
services to the text of § 111.  
However, the Copyright Office’s statement was made over a 
decade ago. And since then, Internet-based technologies have 
improved, are more widely used, and contribute to our national 
economy. Courts should find that the Copyright Office’s view is 
antiquated, and as such, abandon it.   
 
 
                                                            
160 See Aereo, supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. 
161 See 17 U.S.C. § 111(f)(3) (2012) (“A ‘cable system’ is a facility, located in 
any State, territory, trust territory, or possession of the United States, that in 
whole or in part receives signals transmitted or programs broadcast by one or 
more television broadcast stations licensed by the Federal Communications 
Commission, and makes secondary transmissions of such signals or programs by 
wires, cables, microwave, or other communications channels to subscribing 
members of the public who pay for such service.”) (emphasis added).  
162 WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 283 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting U.S. 
Copyright Office, A Review of the Copyright Licensing Regimes Covering 
Retransmission of Broadcast Signals 97 (1997) that “Internet retransmission 
services are not cable systems and do not qualify for § 111 compulsory licenses” 
because they are “‘so vastly different from other retransmission industries now 
eligible for compulsory licensing”). 
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C. Possibility of FCC Involvement  
Because the FCC is involved in many aspects of regulating 
cable television systems,163 looking to this agency for guidance is 
another possibility. In fact, Aereo recently filed an ex parte notice 
disclosing recent conversations with the FCC, where it requested 
the FCC’s support for including a new category of online video 
services with the FCC’s definition of a Multichannel Video 
Programming Distributor.164 Specifically, services whose facilities 
deliver subscribers linear channels of video programming would fit 
this definition.165 This change would allow Aereo to operate like a 
cable-TV provider, meaning a cable system within the § 111 
definition, and thus help Aereo in seeking licenses and negotiating 
for the rights to retransmit channels.166 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 The majority decision in American Broadcasting Companies, 
Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. further muddled an area of law that desperately 
needed clarity. Both circuit and lower courts disputed the proper 
way to interpret the public performance right of copyright holders 
in cases of Internet services that streamed copyrighted broadcast 
television programs to subscribers. Instead of providing clarity and 
guidance to these contradictory lower court decisions, the Aereo 
majority abandoned the volitional-conduct test for direct copyright 
liability and chose an ad hoc and totality of the circumstances test 
for determining whether an Internet system closely enough 
resembled a cable system. Despite the majority’s assurance that its 
holding would not deter future innovations of new technologies, 
implications of this holding for cloud services and the cable cutting 
market indicate otherwise. By refusing to give courts direction in 
determining the legality of new technologies, the Court’s opinion 
                                                            
163 See discussion supra Section IV.B.  
164  Alex Barinka, Aereo Asks the FCC to Change Definition of Video 
Distributor, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2014-10-13/aereo-asks-fcc-to-change-definition-of-video-distributor.html. 
165 An example of such programming is local, over-the-air broadcasting.  
166 See Barinka, supra note 164.  
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interferes with the advancement and usage of cloud computing and 
perpetuates cable monopolies.  
 However, there are options to remedy the negative effects of 
the majority’s holding. For example, Congress could amend the 
Copyright Act by including Internet providers in § 111’s definition 
of cable systems subject to compulsory licensing agreements. 
Congress could also enact new legislation that addresses this issue 
specifically. Alternatively, lower courts could read Internet providers 
into the § 111 definition of “facilit[ies],” despite the Copyright 
Office’s prior statements to the contrary. Finally, the FCC could 
take action by defining Aereo-like services as cable-like systems 
under the Multichannel Video Programming Distributor definition, 
allowing Aereo, and other similar systems, to pursue licensing 
agreements and negotiations as Internet-based cable providers.  
 
 
  
